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The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager 





This paper analyses the implications of a currently publicly debated issue, namely the 
introduction of a bonus tax. We shed light on the effects of the bonus tax on compensation 
components and study its incidence. We use the Principal Agent model within a two-country 
framework and consider two main scenarios. In the first scenario the firm cannot relocate 
managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our 
findings show that the effort based compensation component always rises in the country 
introducing the tax such that the optimal contracts are tilted towards more effort based pay. 
Moreover, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends and thus the incidence falls 
on the firm’s shareholders. With no relocation possibilities, the country that does not 
introduce such a tax will be worse off in terms of welfare, as the dividend income accruing to 
its residents declines. Accordingly, the bonus tax can be interpreted as a transfer from the 
worldwide shareholders to the government levying the tax. However, the welfare results may 
be reversed when manager relocation is an alternative. In this case, welfare in the country 
introducing the tax is lower than in the no relocation scenario, while the country that does not 
levy a bonus tax might even gain in welfare terms. 
JEL-Code: H24, H22, J22, J30. 
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One of the main topics that has dominated policy discussions all over Europe during
the past four months has been the introduction of a bonus tax by the UK and France.
The British Treasury announced at the beginning of December that it would impose
a one-o ex-post 50% levy on any discretionary bonuses exceeding GBP 25,000
(Euro 28,000)1 awarded to employees of banks for the period 9 December 2009
to 5 April 2010. Alistair Darling, the British chancellor, defended this measure by
arguing that banks should use their prots to strengthen their capital base instead of
paying high bonuses. On these grounds, the proceeds from this bonus tax, would be
spent, according to Darling, to refund taxpayers' money which was used for rescuing
banks (Financial Times, 9 December 2009). The French Finance Minister Christine
Lagarde also announced that France would levy a tax on bonuses exceeding Euro
27,500 in 2010. Even the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland proposes a bonus
tax of 8.5% for bonuses exceeding CHF 1 mn, as a response to excessively high
payments.
Moreover, it will be interesting to see the European Commission's stance on these
issues given that it is expected to release a paper on measures it aims to support
at the G20 meeting in June in Canada. One of the main themes of the summit
is nancial sector reform where the leaders will discuss measures 'to help reduce
excessive risk taking and to encourage a culture of prudent behaviour focused on
the long term'.(Toronto Summit, 2010) Therefore, given the increasing support for
such a controversial measure, it is important to analyse its possible implications.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the City of London bonus payouts between 2001
and 2012. One can note the clear peak in 2006 and 2007 when bonuses amounted
to around GBP 10 bn and were thus 41 per cent higher than in 2005. Finally, there
was a dramatic drop by around 60 per cent in 2008 to around GBP 4 bn which
was almost the 2001 level. Given these numbers and assuming for instance that 50
per cent of the GBP 6 bn distributed in 2009 were discretionary, applying a 50 per
cent bonus tax, tax revenues collected by the British government would amount to



































Source: Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) 2009.
Figure 1: City of London bonus payout
around GBP 1.5 bn.
Therefore, taking into consideration the prominence of as well as the worldwide
concern linked to this topic, it is interesting to see what are the implications of
introducing such a tax. Since top executives have very high incomes, the way they
respond to changes in taxes may have important eciency as well as revenue impli-
cations.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to address the above men-
tioned issues. To this purpose we develop a Principal Agent model which captures
these eects. We thus consider a rm which operates in two dierent countries and
employs a manager in each of them to run the rm's operations in the respective
country. The rm (the principal) writes contracts with each of the two agents. We
compute the optimal compensation components in each of the two countries and
then consider the eects of the introduction of a tax on the bonus component in one
of the two economies. If, in addition, we impose the constraint that net of tax wages
have to be equalized between countries and assume equal reservation wages, the net
of bonus tax eort based compensation component in the country raising the tax
3has to equal the eort based compensation component in the other country.2 Our
results are thus consistent with empirical studies that suggest that the elasticity of
earnings with regard to taxes is quite high (see Gruber and Saez, 2002 and Giertz,
Saez and Slemrod 2009) as opposed to studies which measure a low elasticity of
hours worked with respect to taxes.3
Moreover, in the rst scenario, where managers cannot be relocated between
countries, the eort independent wages are also equalized between countries. In
general, if we relax the assumption of identical reservation wages but keep the con-
straint of equal total net compensation, the bonus component will be higher in the
country levying the tax if the reservation wage is higher in this economy.
Overall, in all scenarios, given the higher output dependent compensation com-
ponent, the optimal contracts are tilted towards more eort based pay. On the one
hand, the post tax wage the manager receives is lower, however, on the other hand,
the introduction of the tax reduces the variance of income since the government now
shares part of the risk, and, given the agent's risk aversion, the optimal compensa-
tion contract can now include a higher share of eort based pay.
Moreover, the introduction of such a tax reduces a rm's prots and thus div-
idends. The tax negatively aects eort, such that the rm needs to increase the
manager's compensation to induce her to provide more eort. Therefore rm prots
are negatively aected such that the incidence of the tax basically falls on the rm's
shareholders. This result is in line with the announcement of Deutsche Bank or
Credit Suisse who stated the intention to lower dividend payouts as a response to
the introduction of the UK bonus tax(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19. Decem-
ber 2009).
Regarding the welfare implications of such a policy, the country which abstains
2As opposed to the announcement of Josef Ackermann, in this kind of framework it is not pos-
sible to lower bonus payments in the no tax economy since the manager's participation constraint
would be violated. Such a policy is only viable if the tax is a one time ex post levy. In our
framework, the assumption of equal reservation wages and equal net compensation implies that
the gross eort based wage component in the country levying the tax has to rise.
3The dierence in these two kinds of elasticities results from things like unmeasured eort,
switching to less heavily taxed forms of remuneration or accepting promotion for instance.
4from introducing such a tax might be at a disadvantage, if as assumed in the rst
scenario, the bank needs to employ a manager at each location, so if we disregard
the possible threat of moving any operations to no-tax countries. In this case, the
dividend income accruing to its residents declines. The welfare implications for the
country imposing the tax depend on the reaction of tax revenue to an increase in
the bonus tax as well as on the relationship between the positive tax revenue eect
and the negative dividend income eect. Assuming that the so-called home bias
holds, the country where the majority of the rm's shareholders reside will be at a
disadvantage.4
In a second version of the model, we assume the rm employs a number of
identical managers at each location and, in addition, has the possibility to relocate
managers between countries as a response to a change in the bonus tax. This as-
sumption is in line with the reaction of the majority of nancial institutions such
as Goldman Sachs, Soci et e G en erale, BNP Parisbas, HCBC or JP Morgen which
threatened to transfer operations out of the UK. If we extend our welfare function
to include labour income tax revenue, the welfare implications change as compared
to the case with no relocation. On the one hand, the country introducing the tax
will lose now more since the possibility to relocate managers negatively aects both
labour income tax revenue and the revenue from the bonus tax. On the other hand,
the country that abstains from introducing a bonus tax might even gain in welfare
terms if the positive labour income tax revenue eect generated by the relocation of
managers exceeds the negative dividend income eect.
Of course, assuming the exogeneous outside option of the manager is not a job
in the nancial sector of another country, but another sector of the economy where
no bonus tax applies, the introduction of the bonus tax for bank employees may al-
ter the allocation of human capital across sectors. This basically conrms concerns
which were already raised by banks with regard to the possibility of attracting and
keeping talented people in the banking sector in the future. As shown by Philippon
4Assuming for instance Deutsche Bank shares are mostly held by German compared to UK
citizens, German shareholders would lose more compared to UK shareholders as a result of lower
Deutsche Bank prot distributions.
5and Reshef (2008), wages in the nancial sector in the US were excessively high
between 1990 and 2006 and 30% to 50% of the wage dierential to the rest of the
private sector is accounted for by rents. Therefore, a tax which just aects the nan-
cial sector might improve the allocation of high-skilled human capital across sectors.
This is line with the ndings of research on the allocation of talent. Accordingly,
as Baumol (1990) showed, the relative payos to dierent entrepreneurial activities
largely determines the allocation of human capital to unproductive activities such
as rent seeking or productive activities such as innovation. Thus, a side eect of
the bonus tax, if one believes that the returns in the nancial sector are basically
high rents, would be an improved allocation of high skilled people who would thus
be attracted to work in sectors which benet the society as a whole more than the
nancial sector. However, this is not a stated goal of policy makers who discuss the
introduction of the bonus tax, so we disregard this aspect in the paper, though it is
an important consequence of the tax which can be analysed in future research.
Our ndings are in line with well-known results in the eld of international tax-
ation, which is not surprising, since we consider managers to be highly mobile and
if we interpret the supply of managers the elastic side of the market. Nevertheless,
our contribution is to show that similar conclusions can apply to high-skilled, high
income earners, and that policy makers should be aware of certain consequences of
the discussed policy proposal.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next Section gives a
brief overview of the literature while Section three introduces the model. In Section
four we perform a welfare analysis and Section ve concludes.
2 Literature Review
In spite of the topicality of the issue there is no previous work devoted directly
or indirectly to the eects of bonus taxes on the design of the compensation con-
tracts, on tax revenues and thus welfare in dierent countries. Our work can be
attributed to basically two lines of research. The rst, including the work of Gupta
and Viauroux (2009), Brunello, Comi and Sonedda (2006) and Egger and Radulescu
6(2010) considers the eect of taxes in a Principal Agent model, whereas the second,
including mainly two empirical studies by Hall and Liebman (2000) and Katusc ak
(2009), deals with the eect of personal income taxation on executive compensation.
Using the framework of the Principal Agent model, Gupta and Viaroux (2009)
analyse the eects on eort, wages, prots and welfare of dierent tax sharing rules.
Their ndings suggest that whereas a 100% tax on the employer maximizes eort
and thus expected prots and welfare, a 100% tax on the employee maximizes ex-
pected wages. Moreover, a sharing rule (as usually applied in OECD countries),
where both the employer and the employee pay contributions, does not maximize
any of the considered variables. The second study mentioned, by Brunello, Comi
and Sonedda (2006), considers how taxes alter the balance between provision of in-
centives and individual insurance demand, in the optimal composition of pay. The
authors show that higher average taxes reduce the share of the performance related
compensation component in total pay, whereas the eects of higher marginal taxes
are more ambiguous. Finally, Egger and Radulescu (2010) analyse the implications
of labour taxes for the location of headquarters of multinational rms and show that
income taxes have a negative eect on rms' prots by reducing the agents' eort.
In the second line of research, Hall and Liebman (2009) examine the extent to
which tax policy has inuenced the composition of executive compensation. Their
empirical analysis suggests that tax policy cannot be used as an explanation for the
surge in stock-option pay since 1980. However, the authors show that the joint tax
eciency of the executive and his employer leads to nonqualied stock options dom-
inating cash pay if the capital gains tax rate is positive and the stock is expected to
appreciate. By using options, executives can avoid capital gains taxation. Never-
theless, increasing the use of options increases risk bearing. However, as pointed out
by Katusc ak (2009), if the income tax is raised, the tax benet of options is reduced
such that there should be a shift towards using options less. But due to the tax
increase, the government shares a higher fraction of the payout such that the risk
of option grants is reduced which rebalances the composition of pay towards more
options. Using Execucomp data for the time period 1992-1996 and changes in the
top marginal income tax rate, Katusc ak (2009) shows that a higher tax reduces the
7pre-tax pay-to- performance sensitivity of option grants whereas after-tax incentive
provisions are highly responsive to changes in the marginal income tax rate.
Overall, there is no paper trying to answer the question on the eects of intro-
ducing a bonus tax in one country. We aim to ll this gap and shed light on this
question by extending the Principal Agent model in a two country framework in the
next Section.
3 The Model
3.1 No Relocation Possibility
To look into the eects of the bonus tax on the design of the compensation contracts
and welfare, we extend the Principal Agent model as developed by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987). In this rst version of the model, we make the assumption that it
is not possible for the nancial institution to move any operations and accordingly
the employed managers to the no-tax country, following the announcement of the
introduction of the tax as it needs to run a local subsidiary in each of the two
countries.
We consider a rm which operates in country i = A;B and employs a manager
to run the operations in each of the two countries. Accordingly, the net of tax wage
of the manager in country i, wi equals
w
i = (1   t
L;i)(




where i and i represent the eort-independent compensation component and
output dependent compensation component, respectively, whereas tL;i and tB;i de-
note the labour and the bonus tax rate in the two countries and Qi output in the
respective economy. Since we analyse the unilateral introduction of a bonus tax, we
assume from now on that only country A levies such a tax such that tB;B=0. Each






8where r =  u00
u0 is the coecient of absolute risk aversion. The principal, is risk-
neutral in this framework. Working involves some disutility which is captured by
the distaste function C(ei) which, for simplicity, we assume to be C(ei) = 1
2c(ei)2.
Since we assume that personal eort is costly, c is a positive constant.
Output is a function of eort ei and luck v~N(0;). Accordingly,
Q
i = e
i + v: (3)
The rm's objective is to maximize its expected prots  subject to each of the
agent's participation constraint (5) and the incentive compatibility constraint (6).
Prots are determined as the sum of expected output iE(Qi) of the two countries
the rm operates in, less the compensation paid to each of the two managers:
Max
i;i  = iE(Q




Prots are maximized subject to
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where U(  wi) represents the agent's reservation utility.
With the chosen functional form, a closed-form solution of the agent's certainty
equivalent (CE) to expected utility can be obtained.5 CE can be expressed as the
manager's expected compensation (i+iei (1 tB;i))(1 tL;i) net of her eort cost
c(ei)2
2 and a risk premium r(i)2(1 tL;i)2(1 tB;i)2 2
2 . The introduction of the bonus
tax reduces thus the risk premium that has to be awarded to the managers for the



















5See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for the derivation.























which yields an agent's optimal eort level of
e
i =
i(1   tL;i)(1   tB;i)
c
: (9)
Hence, managers will supply eort up to the point where C0(ei) = i(1 tL;i)(1 tB;i).
Optimal eort increases with the output dependent compensation component i and
decreases with the marginal cost of eort c as well as with the labour tax rate tL;i
and with the bonus tax tB;i, i.e. ei0(tL;i) < 0 and ei0(tB;i) < 0.6 Thus, higher taxes
reduce eort.
Knowing ei, the rm solves
Max
i;i  = i
































This gives us the following optimal output dependent compensation component










1   tL;i +
(i)2(1   tL;i)(1   tB;i)2
2c
(r
2c   1); (13)
6See the Appendix A2 for the derivation.
10Accordingly, in country A where the bonus tax is introduced, the optimal eort
based compensation component A depends positively on the tax rate tB;A, so
dA
dtB;A > 0.7 If in addition, r2c > 1, and as assumed before, no bonus tax is levied
in country B, so tB;B = 0, the piece-rate compensation component will be larger
in the country levying the tax, so A > B. Because of the introduction of the
tax, the risk premium awarded to the agent can be reduced since the government
now shares part of the risk, such that the optimal compensation contract is now
tilted towards more eort based pay. In order to discuss the eects of the bonus
tax on the compensation components and thus prots and implicitly dividends and
welfare in the two economies, we distinguish between the following four dierent
cases. We abstract for the moment from the existence of labour income taxes since
the purpose of this paper is to focus on the eects of a bonus tax, and set for the
moment tL;A = tL;B = 0.
3.1.1 Equal reservation wage and equal total net compensation
In the rst benchmark scenario mangers in both countries face the same reservation
wage such that  wA =  wB =  w. Moreover, in line with the fair wage-eort hypoth-
esis motivated by equity theory introduced in the famous contribution by Akerlof
and Yellen (1990), who show that workers reduce their eort if their actual wages
are lower than their fair wages, we require total net compensation to be equalized
between countries. This so-called fairness constraint is consistent with ndings of
an extensive literature in personnel economics showing that incentives and dierent
compensation policies indeed matter for an individual's eort. Indeed, following the
introduction of the bonus tax, Deutsche Bank even considers changing the compen-


















Thus, if the rm decides to award its two agents compensation packages such that
their net of tax wages are equal, we can derive the following optimal compensation
7See the Appendix A1 for the derivation.









1 + rc2 (16)





2c   1); (17)





2c   1); (18)
Proposition 1. In case of equal reservation wages and equal total net compensa-
tion, the net of tax eort based compensation component in country A equals the
eort based compensation component in the no bonus tax country, B. Moreover, the




B A = B (19)
Proof. The result follows directly from comparing equations (15), (16), (17) and
(18) as well as using equation (14) which requires total net compensation to be equal-
ized between the two economies.
Since both managers have the same utility functions, the same degree of risk
aversion as well as the same cost of eort functions, the 'insurance' part of the
compensation package, namely the eort independent wage is the same, and given
total net compensation has to be equal, the eort dependent wage component in
the country levying the tax has to be larger.
From an ex ante perspective it is not possible to react to the tax by lowering the
eort based compensation at other aliates, as announced by Deutsche Bank, since
this would violate the managers' participation constraint. Such a reaction is only
viable ex post. Thus, the share of eort based compensation in the optimal contract
is now higher because following the introduction of the bonus tax the government
shares part of the risk.
123.1.2 Equal reservation wage and dierent total net compensation
In the second scenario we drop the additional constraint that required total net com-
pensation to be equalized. In this case, and still assuming equal reservation wages,
we can derive the following relationship between the compensation components in
the two countries.
Proposition 2. In case of equal reservation wages but with dierent total net
compensation, the eort based compensation component in country A is larger than
the eort based compensation component in the no tax country, B. However, the
eort independent wage component in the former is lower than the eort independent
wage component in the latter.

A > 
B A < B (20)
Proof. The result follows directly from comparing equations (15), (16), (17) and
(18)
Due to the introduction of the bonus tax, the piece rate component in country A
has to rise to induce the manager to employ more eort. However, since we assume
reservation wages to be equal, the eort independent wage component has to be
lower than in the no tax country and thus, once again the post tax optimal contract
is tilted towards more eort based compensation.
3.1.3 Dierent reservation wages and equal total net compensation
In the following we relax the assumption of equal reservation wages. Using equa-
tions (12) and (13) and imposing the fairness constraint (14), we can derive the






2c(  wA    wB)
cr2 + 1
+ (B)2 (21)
13In addition, if the reservation wage in country A is lower(higher) than in country
B, so is the eort independent wage component.
 wA ?  wB ) 
A ? 
B (22)
3.1.4 Dierent reservation wages and dierent total net compensation
Finally, we consider the last and most complicated case in which neither reservation
wages, nor total net compensation are equalized between countries. In this case, as
in section 3.1.2, it follows from comparing equations (15) and (16) that A > B
if as assumed above, r2c > 1. Additionally, if the reservation wage in the country
introducing the tax is higher (lower), so if  wA ?  wB it follows from comparing
equations (17) and (18)that A ? B.
3.2 Relocation Possibilities Exist
In this section we relax the assumption that managers cannot be relocated between
countries and assume that the rm employs a number Ni(tB;i) of identical managers




To convey our argument, we assume that the number of managers employed at each
location just depends on the bonus tax. Given that this tax negatively inuences
eort, an introduction of a bonus tax in country A will decrease the demand for
managers at this location and increase the demand for managers in country B by
the same amount given the full employment condition (24). Accordingly
dNA




dtB;A > 0: (24)












In this case, rms have a third control variable besides the two compensation
components i and i, namely the number of managers employed at each location,
Ni. We can thus derive from the rm's maximization problem the optimal number
of managers at each location Ni which is implicitly determined by the wage and
eort level at each location.8 Thus, Ni = (i+iei;ei). Since eort in country
A negatively depends on the bonus tax, so does the number of managers employed at
this location. In country B, no bonus tax is levied, eort is accordingly higher and
given the xed number of managers N, the rm relocates managers from country
A to country B. In this parsimonous model, as the demand for managers is just
a function of the bonus tax and given that we consider identical individuals, the
optimal eort level and the optimal compensation components do not change, so
equations (13), (12) and (9) do not change.
4 The Eect of the Bonus Tax on Prots, Divi-
dends and Welfare
To focus on the eect of the bonus tax on rm prots and accordingly dividends
and welfare, we use the results derived in subsection 3.1.2 where reservation wages
are equalized but no fairness constraint applies, as a benchmark. Once again we
distinguish between two distinct cases, namely the rst where managers cannot be
relocated between countries and a second case where relocation is possible.
8See Appendix A.3 for the derivation of the rst order condition.
154.1 No Relocation Possibilities
As can be seen from equation (9), the bonus tax has a negative eect on eort in
the country levying the tax.9 Therefore, the eort based compensation component
has to rise, whereas given the same reservation wage in the two countries, the eort
independent wage component declines following the introduction of the bonus tax.
Accordingly, to be able to derive the overall eects on prots, one has to consider the
combined overall eect.10 Plugging equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) into equation
(10) and dierentiating with respect to the bonus tax tB;A, we can show that rm
prots are negatively aected by the bonus tax.11
d
dtB;A < 0; (27)
Proof. See the Appendix A.4.1.
Since the introduction of the tax lowers the managers' eort, output reacts nega-
tively to the bonus tax and therefore, to induce the manager to provide more eort,
the eort based compensation component has to rise, thus increasing the rm's wage
costs and accordingly reducing prots.
Assume now that all prots are distributed to shareholders in the form of div-
idends, such that  = D. Therefore, since prots are negatively aected by the
tax, so will be dividends. Furthermore, let us assume a fraction  of distributed
prots are held by shareholders residing in country A whereas 1  are distributed
to shareholders residing in country B, so
D
A = D DB = (1   ) D (28)
9See the Appendix A2 for the derivation.
10Remember, as we do not require total net compensation to be equalized between countries,
the compensation components in country B and thus output and accordingly prot in this country
is not directly aected by the bonus tax.
11See the Appendix A.4.1 for the derivation.
16Given these additional assumptions, we can now analyze the eects of the bonus
tax on welfare in the two countries respectively. Welfare is dened as the sum of
the utility of the manager Ui, the dividends accruing to the shareholders in the
respective economy Di and, for country A, the tax revenue raised following the









Plugging into equation (29), equations (28), (3) and (2) and deriving equation
(29) with respect to the bonus tax rate tB;A, we can show that for the country
introducing the tax, country A, the eect depends on the reaction of tax revenue
to an increase in the tax rate. For large values of the bonus tax, so accordingly if
tB;A > 1+cr2
3+cr2 tax revenue reacts negatively to an increase in the tax, and given the
negative reaction of prots and thus dividends shown above, the overall welfare eect
is negative.1213 For low values of the bonus tax, so if tB;A < 1+cr2
3+cr2 the overall eect
on welfare in country A depends on which of the two eects, namely the positive tax
revenue eect or the negative dividend income eect outweighs. For small values of
, so if most dividends are distributed to shareholders in the foreign economy, the
negative dividend eect will be small so we can safely assume a positive eect on
welfare in the country imposing the bonus tax. The opposite is true for large values
of  and in case the negative eect on distributed income is higher than the positive
tax revenue eect.
An unambiguous result can be, nevertheless, derived for welfare in the country
which does not impose the tax. In this case, there is no bonus tax revenue so the
only eect prevailing is the negative dividend income eect. Thus, welfare in country
B reacts negatively following the introduction of the bonus tax in country A. The
12See the Appendix A.5.1 for the proof.
13Given that the manager will only participate if he is given a reservation wage which is equal
across countries, his utility does not change as a result of the bonus tax. His total compensation
declines, however the eort cost is also lower due to lower eort and these two eects will cancel
out
17eect is larger, the larger is the share of dividends held by residents of country B.
To sum up
dW A
dtB;A < 0 if t
B;A >
1 + cr2






dtB;A > 0 if t
B;A <
1 + cr2






dtB;A < 0 (32)
4.2 Relocation Possibilities Exist
We now turn once again to the scenario where managers can be relocated between
countries. Plugging equations (15), (16), (17), (18) and (24) into equation (26) and
dierentiating with respect to the bonus tax tB;A, one can see that rm prots are
negatively aected by the bonus tax. 14
d
dtB;A < 0; (33)
Given the xed number of managers and the fact that the decrease in the de-
mand for managers in country A exactly corresponds to the increase in the demand
for managers in country B, the two basic aects which aect rm prots are the
change in eort and the change in compensation in country A following the intro-
duction of the bonus tax. As in the case with no relocation possibilities, the agent's
provision of eort decreases after the bonus tax is introduced such that the rm has
to compensate her by increased eort based pay. Therefore, the negative reaction of
eort and accordingly output to the bonus tax, combined with the increased wage
costs, negatively aect rm prots. Furthermore, we now drop the assumption
14See the Appendix A.4.2 for the derivation.
18that no labour taxes apply, tL;A = tL;B = 0 and just assume that labour income
taxes are positive but equalized between countries, tL;A = tL;B > 0. Accordingly,
the new welfare function includes tax revenue generated by the labour income tax,



















On the one hand, the country introducing the tax now loses in welfare terms com-
pared to the case where no relocation is possible basically because it loses labour
income tax revenue and potential bonus tax revenue. For values of tB;A above a
certain threshold, the bonus tax revenue eect is negative and given the negative
dividend income eect and the negative reaction of manager demand to the intro-
duction of the bonus tax, welfare in country A declines. Even if the direct bonus
tax revenue eect NA d(tB;iiE(Qi))
dtB;i is positive, if it is small compared to the other
negative eects induced by the introduction of the bonus tax, country A still loses
in welfare terms.
dW A




3 + cr2 or t
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1 + cr2




















dtB;A > 0 otherwise: (35)
On the other hand, the country where no bonus tax is levied, may even display a
positive welfare eect. Following the introduction of the tax in country A, the rm
relocates managers such that country B benets from a higher labour income tax
revenue dNB
dtB;itL;B(B + BeB). If this positive eect is large enough to outweigh the
negative dividend income eect dDB
dtB;i, welfare in country B increases.
19dW B










dtB;A < 0 otherwise (36)
5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
Given the recent discussions about the introduction of a bonus tax it is important
to look into the possible eects of such a controversial policy proposal. Therefore,
the purpose of this paper is to analyse the eects of introducing a bonus tax on com-
pensation components and welfare, as well as to assess the incidence of the bonus
tax. We consider two main scenarios. A rst scenario where there are no relocation
possibilities whereas in the second scenario the rm may relocate managers between
countries.
In the rst scenario we model a rm employing a manager in each of two coun-
tries, and use the framework of the Principal Agent model to shed light on the
eects of a bonus tax introduced by one country. We consider four special cases:
two where reservation wages are equal but total net compensation might be equal
or dier between countries and two cases where reservation wages dier whereas
total net compensation may be equal or dierent between countries. We solve for
the optimal contracts in each country and show that the eort linked compensation
component in the country introducing the tax will be higher. Accordingly, due to
the introduction of the bonus tax, the government shares part of the risk, such that
the optimal contract is tilted towards more eort based pay. Moreover, the bonus
tax negatively aects eort and thus prots and dividends. Thus, the incidence of
the tax is borne by the rm's shareholders. Regarding the welfare implications of
such a tax, the country that does not introduce a bonus tax is worse o in terms
of welfare as the dividend income accruing to its residents declines. The welfare
implications for the country imposing the tax depend on the reaction of tax revenue
to an increase in the bonus tax as well as on the relationship between the positive
tax revenue eect and the negative dividend income eect.
20In the second scenario, the rm has an additional control variable, namely the
number of managers employed in each country. As a response to the introduction
of the bonus tax in one country, the rm relocates managers to the no tax country.
In this case, welfare in the country introducing the tax is lower than in the rst
scenario whereas the country that does not levy a bonus tax might even gain in
welfare terms.
Naturally, such a policy raises also additional questions which need to be ad-
dressed and are interesting for future research. Accordingly, one may consider if the
tax involves any avoidance issues if bonuses are disguised as non-bonus components
or the eects of such a tax if bonuses are paid in the form of stock options and thus
linked to future performance.
Appendix A
A.1 - Change in eort based compensation in country A with




1 + tB;A + rc2(1   tB;A)

A > 0 if rc
2 > 1: (37)
A.2 - Change in eort in country A with respect to a change










(rc2   1)(1   tB;A)
1 + tB;A + rc2(1   tB;A)
  1 < 0: (38)








21s.t. the manager's participation constraint (5) and the full employment constraint
N = NA+NB. If we denote by  the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the full employment
constraint, we can derive the optimal demand for managers in country i as a function
of eort and compensation in the respective country. The rm demands managers
in each country up to the point where the marginal increase in expected output






i    = 0; (40)
dL
d
= N   N
A   N
B = 0; (41)
Equation (40) implicitly determines the optimal demand for managers in country i
as Ni = (i + iei;ei).
A.4 - Change in prots with respect to a change in the bonus
tax
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since rc2 > 1 by assumption.












































which is negative. See the above derivation in A.4.1
23A.5 - Change in welfare in country A with respect to a change
in the bonus tax
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If tB;A > 1+rc2
3+rc2, then as in subsection A.4.1 the bonus tax revenue eect is
negative and since we know that the introduction of the bonus tax reduces the
demand for managers dNA
dtB;A < 0 and has a negative eect on prots and accord-
ingly on distributed dividends, dDA
dtB;A < 0, the overall welfare eect in country A
24is negative. The same result applies even if we have a direct positive bonus tax
revenue eect but the eect is small compared to the negative dividend income
eect dDA
dtB;A, the negative labour income tax revenue eectNA dNA
dtB;AtL;A(A + (1  
tB;A)AeA))+NA d(tL;A(A+(1 tB;A)AeA)
dtB;A and the indirect negative bonus tax revenue
eect dNA
dtB;A(tB;AAeA) induced by the relocation of managers to country B.
Given that as a response to the introduction of the bonus tax rms may now
relocate managers to the no bonus tax country, this country benets and may
even display positive welfare results if the positive labour income tax revenue ef-
fect dNB
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